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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

z

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOHN KYLE LEGG, JR.

:

Case No. 960609-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and sentence entered upon a
plea of guilty to failure to respond to an officer's signal to
stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 416-13.5 (Supp. 1996) (a copy of the statute is attached in
addendum A ) .
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether the prosecutor's recommendation at sentencing

that defendant be incarcerated constituted a breach of the plea
agreement under which the State agreed not to oppose in-patient

treatment if such a program would accept defendant?

Because the

State concedes this issue, no standard of review is applicable.
2.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to

recuse the judge prior to sentencing following disclosure of a
discussion between court staff and the prosecutor at the change
of plea hearing?

This court reviews a trial judge's refusal to

recuse himself for an abuse of discretion, a violation of Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, the existence of actual bias, or
the appearance of bias coupled with actual prejudice.

State v.

Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S.
1090 (1990); State v. Neeley. 748 P.2d 1091, 1094-95 (Utah),
cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1220 (1988); Stfrte v. AlOHZQ, 932 P.2d
606, 610-11 (Utah App. 1997). Actual prejudice occurs where there
is a w*reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant.'" Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 611 (quoting Gardner, 789 P.2d
at 278) .
Based on the State's concession of error on Issue #1, this
Court need not reach defendant's remaining claims of error.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND PULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, John Kyle Legg, Jr., was originally charged with
receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1993);
failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 1996);
and criminal mischief, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (Supp. 1996) (R. 7-8). Thereafter, the
State and defendant entered into a plea bargain pursuant to which
defendant pled guilty to failure to respond to an officer's
signal, the remaining two charges were dismissed, and the State
agreed "not [to] appose [sic] a inpatient [sic] program if one
can be obtained" (R. 29, 56, 90) (copies of the transcript of the
change of plea hearing and of the Statement of Defendant
regarding his plea are attached as addenda B and C respectively).
Thirty-two days later, defendant, through his first counsel,
filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that, based
on a conversation involving court staff and overheard in court
just prior to defendant's entry of his guilty plea, there was a
conspiracy to "mislead" him into entering a guilty plea and the
trial court harbored bias against him (R. 37-38).

Defendant's

original trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw from the case
3

two days later, claiming that defendant's assertion of defense
counsel's involvement in the conspiracy warranted his withdraw
(R. 37-38, 109-10).

The latter motion was granted, and

defendant's current counsel was appointed (R. 42). At
defendant's request, a hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea
was continued (R. Ill), and the trial court advised defendant's
current counsel that he had two days to supplement the record
with evidence to support his conspiracy claim (R. 112-13).
Defendant, through counsel, thereafter filed a motion and
affidavit seeking to have the trial judge disqualified from the
case (R. 61-65) (attached in addendum D).

The affidavit outlined

defendant's version of the conversation and stated that the
conversation, together with the court's knowledge of it, "allows
the fair inference and mitigates the Defendant's belief that the
Court is biased and/or prejudiced against him" (R. 64-65) .
Addendum D.

Defendant also requested and was permitted to

withdraw his earlier motion to withdraw his plea (R. 66). The
motion to disqualify the judge was ultimately denied based on the
insufficiency of the supporting affidavit (R. 70-71, 74-76)
(copies of the relevant minute entries and order are attached in
addendum E), and, following preparation of a pre-sentence
investigation report, the trial court sentenced defendant to the
4

Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years, and
ordered him to pay restitution (R. 72).
Defendant timely appealed, seeking a remand directing that
the trial judge be disqualified from the case and that defendant
be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.

Appellant's Br. at 34.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because of the entry of a guilty plea below, and the absence
of the preliminary hearing transcript on appeal, the true facts
underlying the original charges are not fully apparent on the
record.

The probable cause statement in the information provides

as follows:
Defendant has been identified by Deputy Miller to be
the person who[, on October 22, 1995,] was driving a car
belonging to John Pizzello. Pizzello had reported the car
stolen on October 19, 1995. Defendant sped off when he saw
Deputy Miller. [M]iller activated his lights and siren and
followed Defendant who attempted to flee from him.
Defendant turned his car and drove into Miller's County
Police car [sic], causing damage over $5,000.00.
(R. 8-9).
Defendant's statement in support of his plea provides:
The defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that failed
to stop after receiving a visual or audible signal to stop.
After the car stopped the defendant fled on foot.
(R. 30). Addendum C.

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I: The State concedes that the prosecutor
inadvertently breached the plea agreement by recommending
incarceration at the sentencing hearing.

The State further

agrees that where the issue is raised for the first time on
appeal pursuant to both the plain error and ineffective
assistance of counsel doctrines, defendant is entitled to a
remand to allow him to withdraw his plea under the case law of
this jurisdiction.
Point II: Defendant fails to establish any error in the
trial judge's failure to recuse himself.

Defendant presents no

colorable claim of bias or reasonable question as to the trial
judge's impartiality where the record does not establish that the
court staff member allegedly involved in the subject conversation
made any representation against defendant.

Further, defendant's

claim of an abuse of discretion is without support, and he
establishes no appearance of bias on the part of the court.

Even

assuming bias, defendant fails to establish actual prejudice,
where defendant merely speculates as to the trial judge's
motivation in handling defendant and fails to demonstrate that
there is any reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for
defendant absent denial of his recusal motion.
6

Finally,

defendant failed to include in the appellate record a copy of the
presentence investigation report upon which the trial court
heavily relied in sentencing defendant.

Absent that report, this

Court cannot determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable sentence for defendant.

ARGUMENTS
Although defendant presents a number of different claims of
error, this Court need address only two: (1) the prosecutor's
breach of the plea agreement, which is conceded by the State; and
(2)the recusal of the sentencing judge.

See State v. Maguire.

924 P.2d 904, 905 (Utah App. 1996), cert, granted. 931 P.2d 146
(Utah 1997).

POINT I
GIVEN THE POSTURE OF THIS CASE, DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED
TO A REMAND TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA BASED ON THE
PROSECUTOR'S INADVERTENT BREACH OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT
AS REPRESENTED IN DEFENDANT'S BITTEN STATEMENT,
THEREBY RETURNING THE PARTIES TO THEIR PRE-PLEA
POSITIONS
Defendant's first point on appeal concerns the prosecutor's
breach of the plea agreement.

According to the written statement

of defendant in support of his guilty plea, the prosecutor agreed
that the "state will not apose [sic] a inpatient [sic] program if
one can be obtained" (R. 29; see also R. 56, Affidavit of Lynn R.

7

Brown, "the state at sentencing would not oppose an in-patient
treatment program placement for Mr. Legg if a program would
accept him.") (a copy of Mr. Brown's affidavit is attached in
addendum F).

Addendum B.

The prosecutor signed the written

statement (R. 35). Addendum B.

At sentencing, defense counsel

made the following representation, without any elaboration:
There are two programs out there who are prepared
to accept [defendant]. One is the Salvation Army and
the other one is something called IRC.
(R. 119) (a copy of the sentencing transcript is attached in
addendum G).

A different prosecutor who was present at the

sentencing hearing thereafter made the following recommendation1:
. . . At this point we have to ask you to safeguard
the community, follow the recommendations of the presentence
report an[d] return [defendant] to the Utah State Prison.
(R. 121). Addendum G.

Defense counsel made no objection to the

prosecutor's recommendation, challenging it for the first time on
appeal under the doctrines of plain error and ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.

Appellant's Br. at 17-21.

^•Different prosecutors were involved at different stages of
the proceedings (R. 58, 89, 106, 115). The prosecutor assigned
to the case did not make the plea bargain, and neither of those
prosecutors was present at sentencing (R. 58, 115). The State
recognizes that, while this explains how the error occurred, it
does not excuse it. See Santobello v. New Yorkr 404 U.S. 257,
262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499 (1971).
8

Based on the record before it, the State concedes that the
prosecutor's recommendation at sentencing went beyond the plea
agreement as set forth in the statement of defendant.

Given the

arguments presented on appeal, defendant is entitled to a remand
to allow him to withdraw his plea.

State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d

1266, 1275-76 (Utah 1988) (reviewing the cases of Santobello v.
New York. 404 U.S. 257 (1971), State v. Kay. 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah
1986), and State v. Garfield. 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976), and
finding that Utah law requires that a "defendant must be allowed
to withdraw his plea if the State made a promise it did not or
could not fulfill [,]" regardless of whether the promise would
have influenced the trial judge); ass, e.g.. State v. Irwin. 924
P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996) (refusing to reach same issue when
the situation did not invoke the exceptional circumstances
concept and appellant failed to establish plain error and failed
to raise ineffective assistance of counsel), cert, denied. 931
P.2d 146 (Utah 1997).

Upon withdrawal of the plea, the parties

will be returned to their pre-plea positions, and defendant will
be subject to prosecution and sentencing for all the charges
originally filed against him.

See State v. Gentry. 797 P.2d 456,

459 n.4 (Utah App. 1990), cert, granted. No. 900442 (Utah Jan.

9

30, 1991)2; State v. Valencia. 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah App.
1989); see also Utah Code Ann- § 76-3-405 (Supp. 1997).

POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AN
APPEARANCE OF BIAS, OR ACTUAL PREJUDICE; ACCORDINGLY,
ANY ERROR IN THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FAILURE TO RECUSE
HIMSELF DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL
Defendant argues that the sentencing judge committed
reversible error by denying defendant's motion to recuse the
judge after he was informed about a discussion between the
prosecutor and one of the court's staff which included a comment
about the defendant.

Just before the change of plea hearing on

December 28, 1995, a witness subpoenaed by defendant was waiting
in the courtroom when she overheard a conversation between one of
the court's staff and the prosecutor concerning "allegations of
the defendant's misconduct in court on a prior case" (R. 57, 5859, 109-10).

Defendant contends that his first counsel below was

present in the courtroom at the time; counsel and the prosecutor
claim he was not (R. 58-59, 110). Defendant argues that the
involvement of the court's personnel warrants recusal of the
sentencing judge because it leaves the court's impartiality

2

According to a clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, the
petition for certiorari was dismissed on March 7, 1991, due to
the death of the defendant.
10

"reasonably open to question" and suggests that defendant was
prejudiced by his treatment below.

Appellant's Br. at 32-33.

Prior to sentencing, defendant, represented by current
counsel, filed a motion seeking to disqualify the sentencing
judge from further participation in the case {R. 61-62).
Addendum D.

The motion was supported by counsel's affidavit

which: outlined the offensive conduct as: it had been explained to
him by the subpoenaed witness and defendant; noted that at a
hearing subsequent to the conversation the court had stated for
the record its understanding of the exchange as explained to it
by defendant's former counsel; and summarily claimed that the
court's knowledge wallows the fair inference and mitigates the
Defendant's belief that the Court is biased and/or prejudiced
against him" (R. 63-65) . Addendum D.
The trial court thereafter made a minute entry, explaining
that he was referring the matter to the Presiding Judge Leslie A.
Lewis because the court "questions the sufficiency of the
affidavit" (R. 66, 70). Addendum E.

Judge Lewis independently

reviewed the matter, found the affidavit to be legally
insufficient, and denied the motion (R. 74-75).

Addendum E.

Defendant has the burden of establishing reversible error
when appealing the denial of a motion to recuse a trial judge,
11

and the standard for establishing his claim is found in State v.
Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1997).

In Alonzo. this Court

recognized that there are two alternative avenues available to
defendant in this situation.

First, defendant must show non-

compliance with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, actual bias,
or an abuse of discretion.

State v. Neeley. 748 P.2d 1091

(Utah), cert, denied. 487 U.S. 1220 (1988).
alleges only an abuse of discretion.

Of these, defendant

Appellant's Br. at 32-34.3

Alternatively, defendant may establish the existence of an
appearance of bias together with actual prejudice. See State v.
gflrfer, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S.
1090 (1990); AIQUZG, 932 P.2d at 611.
As a threshold matter, defendant has failed to meet his
burden because he has not provided a colorable claim of bias or
established a reasonable question as to the trial judge's
impartiality.
610.

Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094-95; Alonzo, 932 P.2d at

Defendant's claim rests on his assertion that the court's

staff member made an inappropriate comment to the prosecutor.
Appellant's Br. at 32-34.

However, the only support he has for

*That the trial judge complied with rule 29 is clear in the
record, with both the trial judge and the presiding judge finding
that the documents were legally insufficient to warrant recusal
(R. 70-71, 74-76).
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that point is the affidavit of defendant's current counsel
submitted in support of his recusal motion below (R. 64). On the
other hand, the State's written response to defendant's motion
suggests that it was the prosecutor who stated his "personal
opinions of the defendant" and who did not necessarily "speak
kindly of him" (R. 59). Neither the trial judge nor defendant's
former counsel attributed the comment to anyone in particular (R.
56-57, 109-10).

If the comment is not attributable to the court

or its staff, then defendant's claims of appearance of bias and
abuse of discretion on the part of the court are without merit: a
prosecutor's expression of his personal opinion of defendant, no
matter how inopportune, cannot reasonably operate to clothe the
trial court with bias against defendant.

Because defendant fails

to provide a colorable claim of bias, this Court should affirm
the trial court's denial of defendant's recusal motion. Neeley.
748 P.2d at 1094-95; Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 610.
Similarly, under the Neeley standard, defendant's abuse of
discretion claim should be rejected.

Defendant cites to the Code

of Judicial Conduct to establish the trial judge's responsibility
to make every reasonable effort to ensure that his staff refrains
from behaving in any manner which may be perceived as
prejudicial.

Appellant's Br. at 33. He then summarily claims
13

that the court's failure to "easily" remedy the situation by
recusing himself constitutes an abuse of discretion warranting
reversal.

Id. at 33-34.

However, on this record, it is unclear

that the Code of Judicial Conduct was ever violated inasmuch as
the subject comment is not necessarily attributable to the court.
Even assuming there was an appearance of impropriety, it is clear
in this jurisdiction that, while a trial judge should strive to
comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct, his failure to live up
to the standards therein does not, alone, entitle defendant to a
remand.

Neeley. 748 P.2d at 1094-95; Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 610.

Moreover, there is no support for defendant's claim that the mere
fact that recusal might be an "easy" remedy for any appearance of
impropriety, without more, establishes an abuse of discretion.
Appellant's Br. at 34.
Defendant also claims that the appearance of bias arising
from the participation of the court's staff in the conversation,
coupled with actual prejudice suffered from the trial judge's
failure to recuse himself, warrants reversal.

Id.

He

speculatively argues that "it appears" he was prejudiced by the
partiality demonstrated when the court accepted a guilty plea
absent a legal or factual basis and failed to address the
prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement.
14

Id.

As noted above, the record does not support defendant's
assertion of an appearance of bias. However, even assuming an
appearance of bias, defendant fails to establish actual prejudice
to warrant a remand.

To establish prejudice, defendant must show

that, had the judge recused himself, "xthere was a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.'"
Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 611 (quoting Gardner, 789 P.2d at 278)
(additional citations omitted).
Defendant claims that he suffered prejudice in the taking of
the plea and in the rendering of the sentence.

First, he claims

that the judge appeared to demonstrate prejudice by accepting and
entering a guilty plea without any legal or factual basis.
Appellant's Br. at 34. However, even if the judge had recused
himself upon defendant's request, the plea would still have been
taken because the recusal motion was not filed until forty-six
days after entry of the plea (R. 26-27, 61-62).

A recusal at

that point would not have affected the prior entry of the plea,
so defendant has not established actual prejudice.
Defendant also claims that the trial court's failure to
catch the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement further
demonstrates actual prejudice suffered because the judge refused
to recuse himself.

Appellant's Br. at 34. However, as defendant
15

points out, his own counsel also failed to notice the breach
below.

Without more, the failure to recognize the breach of the

plea agreement does not establish that the court harbored
prejudice toward defendant any more than it establishes that
defense counsel harbored the same prejudice against defendant.
Such a speculative claim fails to establish the "actual
prejudice" required for reversal. Alonzo. 932 P.2d at 611.
Finally, even if this Court were to conclude that the trial
judge should have recused himself due to an appearance of bias,
defendant has failed to establish that his substantial rights
were affected because he has not provided an adequate record on
which this Court could determine whether there would be a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant had his recusal motion been granted.

Alonzo. 932 P.2d

at 611. The sentence imposed on defendant stemmed directly from
defendant's "prior record, his inability to complete probation
successfully, and the underlying facts in this particular case",
which "clearly call out to protect the community" (R. 124-25) .
Addendum G.

The sentencing judge began his explanation for the

sentence he was imposing by noting that he had reviewed the "full
contents of the Presentence Report" and was going to follow the
recommendation contained therein (R. 122). Addendum G.
16

The

Court then identified the "major problem" facing defendant as
"his demonstrated prior conviction record, and the underlying
facts in this particular case" (R. 122). Addendum G.

The court

went on to read from the presentence report, identifying the
content of the report as demonstrating a serious anger management
problem, and noting that the report and the facts underlying this
case show defendant to be a person who not only "is just out of
control and who continually violates the law[,]" but who poses "a
fairly serious threat to the community" (R. 123-24).

Addendum G.

Despite the clear basis stated by the court for its
sentencing decision--which does not appear to rely in any way on
the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation--defendant has failed
to include as part of the record on appeal, the presentence
report which factored so heavily in the sentencing court's
decision.

Absent that report, this Court is unable to determine

whether there was any reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
sentence for defendant had the judge recused himself below.
Accordingly, this Court should assume the propriety of the lower
court's sentencing determination and reject defendant's summary,
speculative, and unfounded claim of prejudice.

See State v.

Christofferson. 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah App. 1990) ("When raising
objections on appeal, appellant has the burden to see that the
17

record contains the materials necessary to support his appeal.").
££^ Ona Int'l. Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 461 (Utah
1993) (refusing to address an issue for which "defendants failed
to supply a sufficient record" for the court's review).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

P.

Q?^day
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this CY
' day of July, 1997
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARl'
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

41-6-13

MOTOR VEHICLES

119

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-13.7

118

Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- tions accordingly; in Subsection (20) inserted *A
ment, effective April 29, 1996, added Subsec- moped includes..." at the end; and in Subsection
tion (10) redesignating the subsequent subsec- (23) added "moped, electric assisted bicycle."

History: C. 19S3, 41-6-13.5, e n a c t e d b y L.
1978, ch. 33,5 38; L. 1981, ch. 269,ft 1; 1987,
ch. 138, 9 6; 1993, ch. 71, * 1; 1995, ch. 20,

ft 89
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXJL — Modern status of sudden emergency doctrine, 10 A.L.R.5th 680.

ARTICLE 2
EFFECT OF AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC
REGULATIONS
41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other traffic controllers.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXJL — Criminal liability for false personation during stop for traffic infraction, 26
A.L.R.5th 378.

41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop —
Fleeing —• Causing property damage or bodily
injury — Suspension of driver's license — Forfeiture of vehicle — Penalties.
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a peace
officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton
disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any
vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or
other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree. The court shall, as part of
any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not less than $1,000.
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes death
or serious bodily injury to another person, under circumstances not amounting
to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second degree. The
court shall, as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not
less than $5,000.
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other
section, an operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from
a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful
or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the
operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace
officer by vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's license revoked
pursuant to Subsection 53-3-220(1 XaXix) for a period of one year.
(b) The court shall collect the driver's license to be revoked and forward
it to the Division of Drivers' License Services, along with a report of the
conviction. If the court is unable to collect the driver's license, the court
shall nevertheless forward the report to the division. If the person is the
holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not
collect the driver's license but shall notify the division and the division
shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing state.

Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Subsection 53-3-220UXaXix)" for "Section 41-2127(lXhr near the end of Subsection (3Xa).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction.
Included offenses.
Jurisdiction.
While the lands on which plaintiff was
stopped for speeding are clearly within the
original boundaries of the Indian Reservation,
they are included in the geographic area that
the United State Supreme Court determined to
no longer be Indian country, and the courts of
this state properly exercised criminal jurisdiction over her for failure to respond to an officar's signal to stop. State v. Kozlowicz, 284

Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Included offenses.
I n p r 0 8 e c u t i o n f o r eluding a police officer,
defendant was not entitled to jury instruction
on lesser included offense of disobeying police
officer because jury had no rational basis to
conclude that defendant did willfully disregard
the officers' signal to stop his car, immediately
increase his speed in response to the officers'
signal, and fail to pull over for several miles,
but was at no time attempting to flee or elude
the officers. State v. Simpson, 274 Utah Adv.
Rep. 44 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

41-6-13.7. Vehicle subject to forfeiture — Seizure — Procedure.
(1) Any conveyance, including vehicles, aircraft, water craft, or other vessel
used in violation of Section 41-6-13.5 shall be subject to forfeiture and no
property right exists in it, except that:
(a) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the
transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited under
this section unless it appears that the owner or other person in charge of
the conveyance was a consenting party or privy to violation of this chapter;
(b) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason of
any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge
or consent; and
(c) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a bona fide security interest
is subject to the interest of a secured party who could not have known in
the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did take place
in the use of the conveyance.
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this section may be seized by any
peace officer of this state upon notice and service of process issued by any court
having jurisdiction over the property. However, seizure without notice and
service of process may be made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest to search under a search warrant
or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant;
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior
judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture
proceeding under this section; or
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has
been used in violation of the provisions of Section 41-6-13.5.
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), proceedings under Subsection (6) shall be instituted without unreasonable delay.
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is in
custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the
orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. When
property is seized under this section, the appropriate person or agency may:
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1

Thursday, December 28, 1995

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

4

Utah vs. Legg.

5

the record please.

6
7

Counsel, would you identify yourselves for

MR. BROWN:

Lynn Brown appearing on behalf of Mr.

Legg.

8
9

This is case No. 951901968, State of

MR. SPIKES:

John Spikes for the State, Your

Honor, standing in for Roger Blaylock.

10

THE COURT:

The court has been informed that

11

there has been a resolution reached in this particular

12

case.

13

believe the disposition to be?

14

Mr. Brown, would you state for the record what you

MR. BROWN:

It is proposed that count 1 and count

15

3, the stolen motor vehicle and the criminal mischief,

16

will be dismissed and there will be a guilty plea to count

17

2, fleeing from a police officer.

18

MR. SPIKES:

19

THE COURT:

That is correct, Your Honor.
And I should ask you as well,

20

Mr. Spikes, and I recognize this is not your case, have

21

any of the alleged victims been informed of this proposed

22

disposition and if so, do you know what their position is?

23

MR. SPIKES:

They have, Your Honor.

We have

24

discussed it with the victims.

Both the owner of the

25

alleged stolen car, as well as the deputy sheriff that was

2

1

involved in the chase.

2

resolution.

3

are leaving the issues of restitution to the insurance

4

companies.

5

They are comfortable with this

There are insurance companies involved and we

THE COURT:

Mr. Legg, is it your desire, sir, to

6

resolve this case by accepting the proposed disposition

7

and enter a guilty plea to count 2 of the information, the

8

charge of failure to respond to an officer's signal to

9

stop, a third degree felony?

10

A.

(By Mr. Legg)

11

Q.

(By the Court)

Yes, I am.
At this time, Mr. Legg, is

12

anyone forcing you or promising you with anything to get

13

you to plead guilty to count 2?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Are you under the influence of any alcohol,

16

drugs or medication or anything else that might interfere

17

with your ability to think clearly and understand what you

18

are doing here today by pleading guilty to count 2?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

Additionally, Mr. Legg, count 2 of the

21

information that you are pleading guilty to, being a third

22

degree felony, carries a potential penalty of zero to 5

23

years at the Utah State Prison, a fine up to $5,000, plus

24

an 85 percent surcharge assessment.

25

be ordered to pay for any restitution or damages that may

As well as you could

0 ft o n y i
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1

have resulted from this incident as well.

Do you

2

understand that those are the potential penalties?

3

A.

Yes, I am.

4

Q.

You should also understand, Mr. Legg, that it

5

is very likely that Mr. Brown, as well as the State of

6

Utah, are going to make recommendations as to how you

7

should be sentenced.

8

understand before you do plead guilty, that I am not

9

obligated to follow any of their sentencing

10

recommendations.

I think it is important for you to

Do you understand that?

11

A.

Yes, I do.

12

Q.

Now there is also the possibility, Mr. Legg,

13

and I don't know if you fall into this category or not,

14

quite frankly, but if you are currently on probation or

15

parole, for example, your guilty plea here today to this

16

charge may in fact be a violation of any probation or

17

parole that you might be on.

18

Additionally, there is the potential that if you

19

are on probation or parole that if a commitment is imposed

20

on this particular case, that the commitment in this case

21

could be ordered to run consecutively with any other holds

22

that you are currently facing.

Do you understand that?

23

A.

Yes, I do.

24

Q.

How far did you go in school, Mr. Legg?

25

A.

11th grade.

0 0 0 P< V; '"

1

Q.

Are you able to read and write and understand

2

the English language?

3

A.

Yes, I am.

4

Q.

Are have you understood everything I have

5

stated to you so far?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Mr. Legg, additionally, by pleading guilty to

8

count 2 of the information, you should understand that you

9

lose a number of very significant rights.

First of all,

10

yon lose your right to a trial and your right to a trial

11

by a jury.

You understand that?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

If you were to have a trial, Mr. Legg, you

14

should also understand the law presumes you to be innocent

15

of those charges.

16

fact, apply during the course of the trial.

17

trial, Mr. Legg, the State of Utah would be required to

18

prove these charges filed against you beyond a reasonable

19

doubt on each and every element of each charge before you

20

could be convicted or found guilty of any of these charges

21

that you are currently facing.

22

failed to meet that burden of proof, Mr. Legg, in all

23

likelihood you would be entitled to be an acquittal or a

24

dismissal of the charges.

25

That presumption of innocence would, in
And at the

And, in fact, if the State

Furthermore, you should also understand that in

1

order to be convicted by a jury, Mr. Legg, the jury's

2

verdict would have to be a unanimous verdict.

3

Additionally, you would have Mr. Brown's

4

assistance at the trial and with his assistance, you would

5

also have the right to question, confront and cross

6

examine every witness called to testify against you.

7

would also have the right to subpoena into court your own

8

witnesses, and an opportunity at a trial to present

9

evidence on your own behalf and to also present witnesses

10

You

or defenses on your own behalf as well.

11

You should also understand, Mr. Legg, that at the

12

trial no one could force you to take the witness stand,

13

testify against yourself.

14

trial and if you were convicted after a trial, Mr. Legg,

15

you would also have appeal rights.

16

and purposes, by accepting this plea agreement and

17

pleading guilty to count 2, you will in fact lose each and

18

every one of the rights that I just described to you,

19

including your appeal rights.

20

limit your right to an appeal by pleading guilty to count

21

2.

You have the right to a speedy

But for all intents

In fact, you substantially

Do you understand all of that, Mr. Legg?

22

A.

Yeah.

23

Q.

You have any questions whatsoever about any

A*

No.

24
25

of that?

$m;:x§
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1
2

Q.

I thought

possibly you had a question about any of those rights?

3
4

Well, I noticed you hesitated.

A.

No.

It is just the situation I am in, that

is all.

5

THE COURT:

Mr. Brown, let me ask you, sir, in

6

terms of count 2, is there a factual basis to support your

7

client's guilty plea to that charge and if there is, what

8

do you believe that factual basis to be.

9

MR. BROWN:

Yes, Your Honor.

I have written it

10

in the guilty plea form.

11

a vehicle that failed to stop after receiving a visual and

12

audible signal to stop.

After the car stopped, the

13

defendant fled on foot.

The elements that 1 have is the

14

defendant, a party to the offense, an operator, who having

15

received a visual or audible signal to stop, did attempt

16

to flee or allude a peace officer by vehicle or other

17

means.

18
19

THE COURT:

The defendant was a passenger in

Did you understand that description

of your conduct, Mr. Legg?

20

A.

Yes, I did.

21

Q.

Is that an accurate description of your

23

A.

That is why I am taking a plea.

24

Q.

Did you engage in that conduct intentionally

22

25

conduct?

and knowingly?

7

1

A.

Yes, I did.

2

Q.

Do you understand that by pleading guilty to

3

count 2, your guilty plea will be an admission of those

4

elements?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And do you also understand that while there

7

are alternative elements to count 2, those elements that

8

you are pleading guilty to are, in essence, the same

9

elements that the State would have to prove beyond a

10

reasonable doubt in order to convict you of count 2.

11

understand that as well?

12

A.

No, not clearly.

13

Q.

Well, let me explain it this way.

You

There are

14

various ways in which count 2 can be committed.

Mr. Brown

15

has just described one way in which it can be committed

16

and you recognized and acknowledged that conduct.

17

I am trying to get you to understand is that if you were

18

to have a trial on this particular case as to count 2,

19

those elements that were just described by Mr. Brown and

20

myself are the same elements that the state would have to

21

prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict you at

22

a trial.

And all

You understand that?

23

A.

Right.

24

Q.

Do you understand that?

25

A.

Yeah, I do.

$'!rtV;!V
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1

THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Spikes, is there anything

2

else you want to add by way of a factual basis as to count

3

2, sir?

4

MR. SPIKES:

Your Honor, I don't believe so.

We

5

don't necessarily agree that that is what occurred but we

6

are comfortable with the admission to those facts and that

7

is an adequate basis to support the plea of guilty for

8

that third degree felony.

9

resolution.

10

THE COURT:

We are comfortable with that

Thank you, Mr. Spikes.

Mr. Brown,

11

have you had an opportunity to prepare a written statement

12

of the defendant in anticipation of his guilty plea to

13

count 2; is that correct?

14

MR. BROWN:

I have, Your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

And you reviewed the full contents of

16

that document with Mr. Legg?

17

MR. BROWN:

I have read it over with Mr. Legg.

18

THE COURT:

Did it appear to you that he

19

understood the full contents of that document?

20

MR. BROWN:

I believe he did.

21

THE COURT:

Mr. Legg, is it correct you had an

22

opportunity to review the full contents of the written

23

statement of the defendant with Mr. Brown?

24

A.

In full, yes.

25

Q.

And do you understand the full contents of

flftft" ":* '-
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1

that document?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Do you have any questions regarding anything

4

contained in the document for either myself or Mr. Brown

5

that you would like to question about at this point?

6
7

A.
there.

8
9
10

No, it is pretty defined as it is stated in

THE COURT:

Mr. Legg, can you tell me in your own

words, Mr. Legg, why you think this is an appropriate way
to resolve this case?

11

A.

At this given time, I was a passenger in the

12

car.

I am on probation now.

I would be found guilty of

13

probation violation for being out at that time of night

14

and

—

15

Q.

Let me ask you this question, Mr. Legg.

Is

16

part of the reason you are accepting this plea agreement

17

is because you are receiving the benefit of the dismissal

18

of the other counts?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

That has nothing to do with it?

21

A.

No.

It is because of how I participated in

22

the crime from which I stated from the very beginning, you

23

know.

I have a baby due in two weeks.

24

get —

You know, I am guilty of these crimes.

25

get on with life.

I just want to
I want to

'0ftC 0 \f y

1
2

Q.

Are you prepared to sign the written

statement at this time, sir?

3

A.

Yes, I am.

4

Q.

You may do so (Pause).

The record may

5

reflect Mr. Legg is signing the written statement of the

6

defendant in open court at this time.

7
8

Mr. Legg, are you satisfied with the services of
your lawyer?

9

A.

Yes, I am.

10

Q.

You also understand the Rules of Procedure

11

give you 30 days from today to file a motion asking for

12

permission to withdraw your guilty plea?

13

A.

Yes, that was explained.

14

Q.

You should understand that even though the

15

rules give you that opportunityt

that doesn't mean that

16

that would occur automatically.

In fact, it does not

17

occur automatically.

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Mr. Spikes, is there anything you would like

20
21
22
23

You do understand that as well?

to add, sir?
MR. SPIKES:

Nothing further, Your Honor. 'We

would ask for a Presentence Report.
THE COURT:

Mr. Legg, formally for the record,

24

how do you now plead to count 2 of the information, the

25

charge of failure to respond to an officer's signal to

00009?

1

stop, a third degree felony?

2

A.

Guilty as charged.

3

THE COURT:

The record should reflect that based

4

upon Mr. Legg's verbal response to the questions put to

5

him this morning, also based upon his knowledge and

6

understanding of the contents of the written statement of

7

the defendant and his signature thereto, the court is

8

satisfied that Mr. Legg's guilty plea to count 2 is

9

freely, voluntarily and knowingly entered and that plea

10

will be received and entered at this time.

11

Mr. Legg, has the right to be sentenced in not

12

less than two nor more than 45 days from today.

13

would like to do is refer him to Adult Probation and

14

Parole for the purpose of a Presentence Report and

15

schedule a sentencing date for him on this case for

16

MR. BROWN:

a Presentence Report that has recently been done.

18

believe it could be done in a fairly

20

~

THE COURT:

When you say "recently," how old is

MR. BROWN:

—expedited way.

Three months or

less.

23

MR. LEGG:

24

THE COURT:

25

So I

that one?

21
22

—

Your Honor, as I indicated, there is

17

19

What I

Late August or early September.
It has been my experience that even

with those updates, as I have explained to Mr. Brown now

'Olrft?.
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1

in chambers with AP&P, it has been my experience they

2

still request at least 30 days.

3

would need 45 days certainly.

4

Let's schedule sentencing for Monday, January

5

29th, today is the 28.

6

time.

7

Presentence Report prior to that.

8
9

I can't see why they

That gives them that period of

It is highly unlikely that I am going to receive a

It has been my experience that it is difficult to
get them within the 30 days, let along to try to get them

10

prior to that time.

11

29th of January and that will be at 8:30 in the morning.

12

MR. BROWN:

So we will set sentencing for the

Your Honor, the defendant having pled

13

to one-third degree, I would ask the court to consider an

14

appropriate bail in this particular case.

15

at $50,000.

16

of 5, between 5 and 10, with the stipulation that he was

17

able to bail out and that he would also be supervised by

18

Pretrial Services.

19

The bail is set

I would ask the court to set it in the area

I don't think he is a flight to run.

He indicates he has got a child that is coming.

20

He has got ties here.

The people who have been in court

21

this morning have ties with him.

22

Lake all of his life.

23

criminal record, I don't think any of it indicates that he

24

has ever not appeared for any type of hearing.

25

been my belief if he were out on bail that he would show

He has lived in Salt

Although he does have some prior

It has

o u *n

1

up for his sentencing.

2

out, but I think that he should have at least an

3

opportunity to try to bail out with an appropriate bail in

4

this case.

5

PretriE*. Services.

6

I am not sure he can even bail

And if he did, to be supervised also by

THE COURT:

As you are aware, and Mr. Spikes may

7

not be aware, I don't know, we had a prior bond hearing in

8

this particular case.

9

changed as a result of Mr. Legg entering his guilty plea

I am not so sure that anything has

10

here today from the ruling I entered at that bond

11

reduction hearing, other than the fact that I didn't make

12

this clear on the record consistent with the plea

13

agreement, counts 1 and 3 should be dismissed at this

14

time.

15

State's behalf, sir?

16

MR. SPIKES:

Mr. Spikes, what would you like to say on the

I think our concern, and again I

17

don't have the full information, Your Honor.

18

Mr. Blaylock covered that hearing.

19

currently on probation.

20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

I believe

He clearly is

Is that probation for a felony

offense?
MR. SPIKES:

I believe it is for a number of

misdemeanors out of Judge Palmer's court.
MR. BROWN:
before Judge Palmer.

I think it is a class B misdemeanor

14

1

MR. LEGG:

a

MR. BROWN:

3

MR. LEGG:

4

Class A.
Class A to class B.
There has been nothing from AP&P to

violate my probation at this time.

5

THE COURT:

You know, Mr. Brown, I am inclined to

6

keep Mr. Legg's status as it is.

7

dismissal of counts 1 and 3 substantially change my view

8

of this case based upon my earlier ruling in this case.

9

I am not persuaded that

Additionally, and I know I don't need to cite the

10

statute to you, Mr. Brown where once he has entered a

11

guilty plea, then of course the responsibility becomes Mr.

12

Legg's to make the appropriate showing under this statute.

13

I am just not persuaded that that is accomplished here.

14

MR. BROWN:

I just think his ties to the

15

community are such that he would appear for his hearing,

16

even in the worse scenario.

17

THE COURT:

Let me interrupt you, Mr. Brown.

18

This is a situation where pretrial has not looked at Mr.

19

Legg because of the level of bail set?

20

MR. BROWN:

The level of bail is one of their

21

considerations and the fact that he is on probation is

22

probably their big concern even though it is a misdemeanor

23

probation.

24
25

MR. BROWN:

Did you want to say anything further,

Mr. Legg?

06fl*<v

15

1

MR. LEGG:

Yeah, there was one thing.

Upon me

2

being booked in the Salt Lake County Jail, I was never

3

even screened for Pretrial or anything like that because

4

of medical conditions.

5

moved me from the hospital to the medical ward and I was

6

never even screened.

7

to do with it.

8
9

THE COURT:

I was in the hospital and they

So I don't know if that has anything

Let's do this, Mr. Brown.

While I am

going to order that bail remain as previously set, what I

10

will do and I will ask that you take care of this,

11

Mr. Brown, I will order that Pretrial Services at least

12

interview Mr. Legg and let me receive their opinion as to

13

whether or not they are willing to supervision him or not.

14

Also in the meantime, Mr. Spikes, I would ask that

15

Mr. Blaylock supply some input to this court and Mr. Brown

16

as to what his position is now that we have reached this

17

far in the case.

18

MR. BROWN:

Could I have a minute entry saying

19

that the court ordered that Pretrial to take a look at

20

him, otherwise they won't pay much attention to me.

21
22

THE COURT:

Okay.

Susan will get that for you.

Okay.

No.

Anything else?

23

MR. BROWN:

24

MR. SPIKES:

25

THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.
We will recess.

'$'(;ui;(;

REPORTER'S
)
)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH

ss.

I, DOROTHY L. TRIPP, C.S.R., do hereby certify:
That I am one of the Official Court Reporters of
the Third District Court of the State of Utah.
That on Thursday, December 28, 1995, I reported
the testimony and proceedings, to the best of my ability
on said date in the above entitled matter, presided over
by the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley in the Third District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah; and that
the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 15,
inclusive, contains a full, true and correct
account of said CHANGE OF PLEA to the best of my
understanding, skill and ability on said date.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 11th day
of September, 1996.

ST

< ^ ^ ^ < gr<-«

^ ^

Dorothy L. 2tipp, C.S.^f /
Official C£urt Reporter
License No. 22-102239-7801

0 f> <s J ?f •:
'

-

*

•».

ADDENDUM C

Third Juotciaf District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DEC 2 8 1995
STATE OF UTAH

SA1TIi

r

JT¥

tr
THE STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER

v.
Case No

<Pa* k•x?f.

. fs/fomr*

Defendant.

COMES NOW. ^L^

L^z

, the defendant in this case

and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the following crime(s):

CRIME & STATUTORY PROVISION

DEGREE

PUNISHMENT

&h jr&-f~ fcrf ^ M ft
cjifcom Sift***
B.

M«
p-ti<fK*~

-fo

shp

^y^ttJ^
>f- ay^e

£&^

C. fr» Dbk~-<*</

I have received a copy of the. (chargeLPnformation) against me, I have read it,
and I understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading
(guiltyHiio contest).

wwa*

c:&*

The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows:

My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable,
that

constitutes

the

elements

of

the

crime(s)

charged

are

as

follows:

I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and
understanding of the following facts:
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I
recognize that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount,
as determined by the court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me.
2. I (have hotWhave) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right
to counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following
reasons:

001)030

3.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and

understand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other
proceedings and the consequences of my plea of guilty,
4.

k

If

I have not

A W A #7flyay

waived

my right to

counsel, my

attorney is

> and I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement,

my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney.
5. I know that i have a right to a trial by jury.
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also
know that I have the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense
to testify in court upon by behalf.
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to
do so I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify.
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not
guilty" and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the
burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial
is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous.
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted
by a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal by conviction and
sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court
and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be

3

0 00 031

paid by the state.
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to
which I pleacfTguHt^ (no contest). I know that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) to an
offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself
to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense.

I know that the

sentences may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know
that in addition to a fine a httfeHty-fivg-percent IgSsm) surcharge, required by Utah
Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by
the court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes.
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for
additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am
on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
12. I know and understand that by pleadinggguijtyj)(no contest) I am waiving
my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also
know that by entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have
committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s)
is/are entered.
13. My pleats) of^gujjty? (no contest) (is) (is not) the result of a plea bargain
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions
of this plea bargain, is any, are gully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this

4

Q0S03?

affidavit.
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of (guilty)
(no contest) I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my
plea.
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession of recommendation of
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing
made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the court may do are also not binding on the court.
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to
induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained herein and in the
attached plea agreement, have been made to me.
17. I have read this statement or I have had i read to me by my attorney, and
I understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything
contained in this statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
19. I am %H

years of age; I have attended school through theCr^ f) grade

and I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s).
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which

5

G0003?

impair my judgment.
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any
mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this 2<f

day of

19

AKL-^L-,

?£^

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney f o r - f f i h A ^

J^spn

, the

defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read
it to him/her and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent.
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct
are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations and declarations
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

/ATTORNEY FO~R DEFENDANT/BAR #

6

0 0 0*034

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
rffifalA.

r^?**)

• defendant. I have reviewed this statement of

the defendant and find that the declarations, including the elements of the offense of
the charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats or
coercion to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are
fully contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as
supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable cause to believe that
the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which
the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public
interest.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR #

00005?

ORDER

Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification
of the defendant and counsel, the court witnesses the signatures and finds the
defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so
ordered that the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set forth in
the statement be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this

ffi

day of l f e < ~ ^

, 19J£T

ISTRICT COURT JUDGE

8
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ADDENDUM D

RUT, * * T 5 W T ftieSST
Third J Ju.cjal District

FEB i 2 1996

BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX # 6 2 0 7
ATTORNEY AT LAW
MONTREUX FRERES, P . C
310 SOUTH MAIN, TWELFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 ) 3 2 2 - 3 0 2 1

SAtfLAAECG'*

~

1

puiyCleck

FAX NUMBER ( 8 0 1 ) 359-7406
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
RULE 63(B) MOTIOH
TO DISQUALIFY THE COURT
FROM FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

PLAINTIFF,
VS.
JOHN KYLE LEGG, Jfc.,

CASE NO.

DEFENDANT.

951901968 FS

JUDGE T. E. MEDLEY

The Defendant in this matter, John Kyle Legg, Jr., by and
through his attorney of record, Bel-Ami de Montreux, and pursuant
to Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves
for the disqualification of the Court from further proceedings in
this matter.

The grounds for this Motion are explained in

Counsel's affidavit in support of this motion filed herewith.
DATED this 11th day of February, 1996.
RERES ,

P.C.

'Montreux
Attorney for Plaintiff!

OOOOflf

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on February 12, 1996, I hand-delivered
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to the following:

Roger S. Blaylock, Esq.
District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915

000062

Third Judicial District

FEB 1 2 1996
fcLfLAXE COUNTY

J£vCpuiy Qter*

BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX # 6 2 0 7
ATTORNEY AT LAW
MONTREUX FRERES, P . C .
310 SOUTH MAIN, TWELFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH
84101
TELEPHONE
(801) 322-3021
FAX NUMBER ( 8 0 1 ) 359-7406
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT IH SUPPORT OF
RULE 6 3 ( B ) MOTIOH
TO DISQUALIFY THE COURT
FROM FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,

vs.
JOHN KYLE LEGG,

No.

J&.,

CASE

DEFENDANT.

JUDGE T .

SALT LAKE COUNTY

)

STATE OF UTAH

)

951901968 FS
E.

MEDLEY

:ss

I, Bel-Ami de Montreux, Attorney at Law, and counsel to the
Defendant in this matter, Mr. John Kyle Legg, having been sworn
upon my oath, depose and state:
1.

The

represented

by

Defendant
Mr. Lynn

is

an

Brown

indigent
of

the

who
Utah

was

previously

Legal

Defenders

Association.

0OMp?

2.

I was recently retained to represent the Defendant after

his former attorney moved the Court to withdraw as counsel for the
defendant, alleging conflict of interests.
3.

The Defendant's motion to withdraw the plea of guilty

the Defendant previously entered
pending before the Court.

in this matter is currently

Mr. Lynn Brown had filed the Motion,

and most recently, I submitted the Defendant's affidavit and the
affidavit of Mr. Lynn Brown in support of the motion to withdraw
his plea.
4.

Since my appearance in this matter, I have had an

opportunity to review the file and the affidavits submitted in
support of the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.

I have

also interviewed the Defendant and other people with relevant
information in this matter.
5.

The basis for the motion to disqualify the Court is

that, on the day the Defendant was here to accept the plea
agreement Mr. Lynn Brown negotiated on his behalf, a subpoenaed
witness, Ms. Bonnie Villalobos, overhead a conversation between
Court's

personnel

and

the

Prosecutor.

Allegedly,

Court's

personnel said that Mr. Legg was not fit to be free and that he
should be locked up for a long time.

Allegedly, Mr. Lynn Brown

joined in the conversation.
6.
Plaintiff,

Last Monday, on my first appearance on behalf of the
the

Court

exhaustively

explained

the

occurrences

between its personnel, the Prosecutor, and the extent to which the
Court believed that Mr. Lynn Brown did not act improperly.

00006 4

7.

Obviously, the Court is aware of the allegedly improper

and inferably detrimental conversation between its personnel and
the Prosecutor.

That knowledge allows the fair inference and

mitigates the Defendant's belief that the Court is biased and/or
prejudiced

against him and that the case against him cannot

continue in this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant RESPECTFULLY requests that the Court
disqualifies itself from further proceedings in this criminal
case.
DATED this 11th day of February, 1996.

Subscribed

and

sworn to before me this

/jL

day of

February, 1996.

NOTARY PUBLIC
PEGGY LHERRIW
2<XE.Su7¥TwC*Or.$arriy(UT
Uy Commotion Expifw JuJy 20,
STATE OF UTAH

0 00 06*

ADDENDUM E

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

f IIIfTTTE ENTRY

NOTICE

D. I ••

FEBRUARY 12f 19 y 6

"U"!!,

Case No:

951901968

J O H N K ill .E I! R I E G G

.Judge:

TYRONE E. MEDLEY

D e 1: si i :l.£

CI ex k:

STH

(Jail)

Reporter: LiOROTHY 1 M1PP

Plaintiff,

FS

HEARING
This case xs before the court for MOTION HEARING on the charges
(2)

I, . 1 1 , "II L"" S T ' J P j i Hh 1 -" I '

, MMAND '"M1 POL! 1,11

(Third Degree Felony)

Appearing for the State is ROGER BLAYLu,1

defendrin*

li

;

liiii I .."jiuiiiL , Appearing as counsel for the defendant i& BEL AM J
D r MONTREUK.
Based ' p

i

defendant's mot .,,,, »

uf t.»nni&^ 1 for the defendant
withdraw

' 'l

, 'i

respond, to defendant's Rule 63(B) •" ' '• "

icurf nrders

Midrav .
,

"ebruax m1

"
i

I

refer Defendant's Rule 63(11] Motion to Judge Lewis foi '
consideration and sentencing or disposition is continued to February
2 6 at in Imii

*)«(!{?§£

Case Number: 951901968 FS
The court schedules the following on the date indicated:
EVENT:
DATE :
TIME :
PLACE:

SENTENCING
FEBRUARY 26, 1996
8:29 AM
ROOM 403

ADDRESS: METRO. HALL OF JUSTICE
240 EAST 400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
Judge : TYRONE E. MEDLEY

The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of
the County Sheriff.

O'ooce?

Third JuoiciaJ District

FEB 2 3 1996
8/2£

i

&puly Oteffc

IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
J 0 H M

1

II IIIIIIIIIF'ill^ Il I111!! B i t ' 1 INI Y

I

CASE NO. 951901968

:
K Y L E

LEQ(}

JR^

x

Defendant.

ii

The defendant in the above entto Disqualify Judge in accordance vith rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules
iJf

Civil Procedure.

This Court questions the sufficiency of the

affidavit therefore the matter Is referred to the Presiding Judge
I PSI

it

i
Il il

26,

J.ew'is for determination.
i L L e r:

li

11 m i' e n t 1 y s i: h e i ,i 11 il

n
i

III

III

"

111 e n c, 1 mi m i

Ii

F P 1" i 11 « ni y

iy""36.
Dated t h i s

SL2>

day o f Februajry%
rua^y*, 1 9 9 6 .

JNE E. MEDLEY
[CT COURT JUDGE

0 r,fl<7 C

STATE VS LEGG

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry to the following, this

JX&

day of

February, 1996:

Roger S. Blaylock
District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bel-Ami De Montreux
Attorney for Defendant
310 South Main, Twelfth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

0

000071

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

ORDER

:

CASE NO. 951901968

:

JOHN KYLE LE6G JR.,

:

Defendant.

t

"Till is matter was referred to the presiding judge In accordance
«PI. in I In

IIHili,«

iii I (ill ni |i

ill I in

a s s i g n e d judge a f t e r

i n I ill il «<" i mi il p"1,

the. Kill

m
i Ci

1

ni i Procedure

t tound Lite a t t i d a . i l

by t h e

I luni

I

prejudice insufficient.
Upon
affidavil

ni ndependpnl
I | iI I >

conversation
11 i i i ! .i

ii

IIIII

I li ill

iI 1

hi

i

revii u

I Hi

ill I i 11 iiii
i Ill

T h e
IIIII

i I

pi i s i d i n g

il

judge o v e r h e a r d t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n .

1111 I in

I inds t h e

11 ie i e i e i m i

i

i 11 between a court, c l e r k and a
mi ppresentat

k'uiUii II

illl ( t h e j u d g e i s b i a s e d i n f a c t a g a i n s t

dt the

I

is^iqned

i s no all lh m ill i IIIII

il 11 II *". det eiiiiilanL for any

- mere f a c t t h a t a c o n v e r s a t i o n may have o c c u r r e d Jbetwt'eii
f

personnel

and ii prosecutor, does mi

m
i

Il M

i n d i c a t e a Court i s
p

I "• f r r e c u s a l .

i\ i) ra",:; i

STATE V. LEGG

PAGE TWO

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, this case is referred back to the
assigned judge.

/"/

^*---

s'

^>

/

Dated t h i s
/

,
Sttt

w

„ . y\
"¥. LEGES'

PRESIDING JUDGE

0 0 007?-

STATE V. LEGG

PAGE THREE

ORDER

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I herehy certify that T mailed i true arni correct copy of the

f*l\
foregoing

Roger

uidui ,

I i I I in

lull I N I I I |

I In i s

/

"'

.da'j

I Mill .III

I i n

S • B l a y loci: k

Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite
Salt.,, Lake City# Utah 84111
Bel-Ami de Montreux
Attorney for Defendant
310 S. Main, 12th Floor
Salt Lake <"'
** «*
Honorable Tyrone r
240 East 400 South
Salt Lave City, m-a

y

K. -IYIMMMUTW

u '< r , ; p

ADDENDUM F

LDA

WED 09:09

NO. S C 5320330

LYNN R. BROWN, #0460
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC
424 East 5 0 0 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN KYLE LEGG, JR.,
Defendant.

Case No.

95190I968FS

J U D G F T Y R O N E E MFDL.EY

The undersigned, LYNN R. B R O W N , duly deposes and says:

' • - . ? - - - l o h n Kvle Les?
2.

That on December 2 V, I »' t't, ilic ilHi'inliini fi IM'I «d d yuiliy \J\*A m < mini

II, I illi'ii• in ki'siiiiiiil in in i >rfir a r / s Sipnal ro Stop, 1 J u r d degree felony, and sentencing
was set for February 5, 1996.
3.

That the plea LMIgaining r.onslsted

nl ll

"' rfkmf«.ii nf rnunr |f Receiving or

Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle, A Second Degree Felony; and Count III, Criminal
Mischief, a Third Degree Felony. It was also agreed that ti
n i in

i in in ihiriHir rrpntment program placement for Mr. Legg if a program would

accept him.

OG005*

FAX NO. 2.' 320330

wi/r

4.

P. 03

That at the rime of the guilty plea, I was informed by the prosecution that

one of the Defendant's friends, Bonnie Villafobos, a supoenaed witness, was present and
overheard a conversation between the prosecution and court personnel about allegations
of the defendant's misconduct in court on a prior case.
5.

That I was also informed by Ms. Villalobos that she overheard said

conversations and she considered them offensive and prejudicial to the defendant.
6.

That the defendant became aware of this incident from conversations with

Ms. Vlllalobos and informed me that he wanted to withdraw his plea because of his belief
that his attorney, the judge and the prosecution were privy to the informal conversation
and the plea bargain was not made in good faith.
DATED this

f

day of February, 1996.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED;

#

&

LYNN R, BROWN
Attorney at Law
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

On thet

d
f
L
*y cof
February,
1996, personalty appeared before me, Lynn R. Brown, the signer of the
( day
1

foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me diat he executed the same.

J^JQJAJL&XJ

NOTASY PUBUC

Dtart~ 2. Grambow
424 S . - : 500 Sou*#300
Salt t ..::> City, Utah 04111
Kv Cdftrmttfon Exp*m
Ajrni to, \Wf
I

m

STATE <dMgPAfl J
My Commission Expires:
{ 1 J

NOTARY
Residing im

<;££
00005?

ADDENDT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Transcript of:

STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff,
SENTEHfclDlDISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

vs.

sb>.

SEPJ 61996
JOHN KYLE LEGG, JR.

By.
"'

Defendant.

tSefStny^lerfc

Case No. 951901968 FS

The above-entitled cause of action came on
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley,
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the
State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, on Monday,
February 26, 1996.
Appearances
For the Plaintiff:

HOWARD LEMCKE
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South #300
Salt Lake City, Utah

For the Defendant:

BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX
Attorney at Law
310 South Main #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah

FHED^?«§ST£fsJ$&T
Third Judicial District

SEP 1 6 1996
S/'-tTLAXECOUK
Dy£w Cterfc

FILED
DC: b - '£96
Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

n M A

00 0 * 4

%dp0^cA

1

1

Monday, February 26,

2
3

1996

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

This is the No. 3 case on the

4

calendar, case No. 951901968, State of Utah vs. Legg.

5

record should reflect Mr. De Montreux and Mr. Legg and

6

Mr. Elizondro (Mr. Lemcke), that I referred this matter,

7

based upon the defendant's filing of a Rule 63 Affidavit

8

of Prejudice.

9

sufficiency of the affidavit and referred the matter to

Consistent with that rule, I questioned the

10

Judge Lewis for review.

11

on Friday and gave the case back to me, finding the

12

allegations and affidavit insufficient.

13

The

Judge Lewis reviewed that matter

Additionally, last Friday and I think most of

14

last week, Judge Lewis has been involved apparently in a

15

jury trial.

16

her ruling to a written order.

17

place this matter on the record here today and she did

18

indicate that either today or tomorrow that she would

19

place the written order in the file.

As a result of that, she was unable to reduce
Gave me permission to

20

With that issue resolved, I need to ask you, Mr.

21

De Montreux, if you know of any legal reason why Mr. Legg

22

should not be sentenced at this time?

23

MR. DE MONTREUX:

24

THE COURT:

25

No, Your Honor.

You have had an opportunity to review

the Presentence Report; is that correct?
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1

MR. DE MONTREUX:

2

THE COURT:

3

I did, Your Honor.

And what is it you would like to say

on Mr. Legg!s behalf?

4

MR. DE MONTREUX:

Your Honor, this is a difficult

5

case and I read the Presentence Report and I have to say

6

that I am somewhat disappointed in the Presentence Report.

7

The reason being, I see they gave the court a few pages,

8

about five or six pages, trying to explain to the court

9

why this man should go to prison.

However, that

10

Presentence Report for some unknown reason failed to look

11

at this person as a real person.

12

background, what he has been through in his life.

13

man has suffered hell and that is what he has been through

14

from his family's hands.

15

Failed to look at his
This

It this man went to trial, the court would have

16

heard of a man who was a victim of his own family, his own

17

mother.

That is why he is here today.

18

chance.

This man was set to fail and he has failed.

19

is a Presentence Report that doesn't look at him as a

20

person.

21

prison like a dog; that is where he belongs."

22

Never had a
Here

Doesn't give him a chance, but says, "Send him to

Your Honor, this is not fair.

This system should

23

be helping people to rehabilitate themselves.

Should give

24

them an opportunity to come back and be members of society

25

that we can trust.

Why is it the only thing we want to do
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1

is send them all to prison just because they make mistakes

2

and when they are accused?

3

This man was a victim of his own family his

4

entire life.

He has been beatened, abused.

The

5

Presentence Report doesn't care.

6

in this situation, they want him to go to prison.

7

spent five years in prison before•

8

He spent half of it in there with prisoners without

9

interest.

Because he was involved
He

It was a tough time.

That is his whole motive.

Never had any.

10

never had you.

He never had me.

11

opportunities.

He had a bad family*

12

him as a person. They only look at him as a bad person

13

that should be caged for the rest of his life.

14

He

He never had good
They never looked at

After serving five years in prison, and get out

15

in 1993.

16

before this court and that is because he has learned to

17

accept some responsibility for his actions.

18

back here unfortunately.

19

Since 1993, Your Honor, this man has not been

Now he is

Now why is it we do not send this guy somewhere

20

to get the treatment he deserves? Why are we going to send

21

bi^fc back to prison to coifce back & <«orse parson.

22

puzzling to me.

23

rehabilitate themselves.

24

them, Your Honor.

25

Presentence Report.

That is

Our system should begin to help people
Not only punish them, punish

Give this man a chance.

Go around the

Find a reason to give this man a
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1

chance.

2

Can give him a second chance or even if it is a third or

3

fourth chance.

4

Show to him that somebody, you, can trust him,

Spare his life.

John Legg can be a good member of society and I

5

believe given the opportunity, he can do it.

6

two children to feed.

7

other day, a month ago while he is in jail that he hasn't

8

had a chance to interact with.

9

there, work and support his family.

10

He has got

He has got a kid born just the

He would like to go out

Your Honor again, let's look at this man as a

11

person.

12

are justifications for it.

13

opportunity.

14

take responsibilities for his actions.

15

He showed that he could do it for a few years.

16

regrets.

17

we never give that person again a chance, that person is

18

going to come back a lot worse.

19

His criminal record is bad.

He has never, ever had an

Of course, he is old now and he has got to

Many of us fail.

He can do that.
He

But then again, Your Honor, if

Give this man a chance.

There are two programs out there who are prepared

20

to accept him.

21

one is something called IRC.

22

Your Honor, there

One is the Salvation Army and the other

Your Honor, there are certain stringent

23

conditions that you can impose on this guy.

You can

24

require that he serve a very stringent probation.

25

take a lot of civil liberties away from him.

We can

The worst
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1

thing we can do this morning is to take this man, send him

2

to the Utah State Prison, and then he is going to come

3

back.

4

person will he be?

5

Your Honor, I am not going to go on.

6

This guy will serve the sentence.

What kind of

He is going to come back here again.

Your Honor, will you show this man that we can be

7

fair even if he is not a fair person.

8

entire life, and give him a chance.

9

proceed with his life.

To look at him, his
He is prepared to

Place this man on probation.

He

10

has already served about five months in the County Jail.

11

Keep him in the County Jail for another 4 or 5 months.

12

Please do not send this man to the Utah State Prison.

13

This is not an appropriate university for him to graduate

14

from again.

15

again.

16
17
18
19

That has failed before and that will fail

Please.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. De Montreux.

Who is

representing the State on this matter?
MR. LEMCKE:

Howard Lemcke on the sentencing,

Your Honor.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. LEMCKE:

Go ahead, sir.
Your Honor, although counsel makes

22

an eloquent case for looking at this situation of the

23

defendant, and looking at what we can do, what is

24

perceived best for him.

25

Honor, and ask you to do what is best for the community.

We have to come in here, Your
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1

As counsel mentioned, it is a horrible record,

2

He has, in fact, been out to the prison*

3

that his conduct will be punished.

4

of this bargain here by taking the number of things that

5

were charged, the number of things that could have been

6

charged for the ramming of the police car, the fleeing,

7

And he has had the benefit of this bargain.-

8

we have to ask you to safeguard the community, follow the

9

recommendations of the presentence report an return him to

10

He is on notice

He has had the benefit

At this point

the Utah State Prison.

11

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Lemcke.

12

MR. DE MONTREUX:

Your Honor, if I may quickly

13

respond.

14

in the system where they should have to rehabilitate

15

themselves, not punish them.

16

nothing but punishment because this man has never had a

17

chance.

18

Again, I would like to stress there comes a time

What the State is asking is

Again, I am asking the court to scan his entire

19

life.

Do not synthesize to this five pages or six pages

20

in your hand.

21

this to a year in prison, in the jail house over there.

22

Let him finish that time, Your Honor. Let him go back to

23

his family.

24

cause he was not given it.

25

before.

Please give this man unfortunately, reduce

Let him get the treatment that he deserves
He never had it in prison

Let us please in this case make an exception.
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1

Get Mr. Legg, unfortunately, to believe in us because

2

right now I believe that he can be a better person if

3

given that opportunity.

4

leave this to your sound discretion.

5

THE COURT:

Let me say this, Your Honor.

Thank you, Mr. Demontreux.

I

I have

6

had an opportunity to review the full contents of the

7

Presentence Report.

8

follow the recommendation that is contained in the

9

Presentence Report.

And let me say that I am going to

The major problem that I have with

10

Mr. Legg is his demonstrated prior conviction record, and

11

the underlying facts in this particular case.

12

think I need to restate for the benefit of the record the

13

defendant's prior conviction record.

14

It is not really in dispute.

15

I don't

I have it before me.

At the time of the commission of this particular

16

offense, Mr. Legg was also on probation.

17

Report tells me that the commitment that he did do at the

18

prison, at least according to the Presentence Report, he

19

was initially placed on probation.

20

probation was revoked.

21

of the Presentence Report.

22

negatively)

23

THE COURT:

The Presentence

And then that

Again, I am reading the contents
(Defendant shaking head

Based on some of Mr. Legg's own

24

comments that are set forth in the Presentence Report, it

25

is clear as well that Mr. Legg has a problem maintaining
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1

control and maintaining his own on anger.

2

would admit to that.

3

I think even he

This is a situation where it was a dangerous

4

situation: the fleeing incident itself.

5

apparently we have a driving pattern where the vehicle

6

engages in some form of spin-out%and the ultimate result

7

is, in essence, a head-on collision with the police

8

vehicle, causing several thousands of dollars of damage.

9

And then

There is one thing you said, Mr. Demontreux, that

10

I agree with one hundred percent.

And to be honest with

11

you, it is a little bit scary.

12

performance and past history is any indication of future

13

performance, there is a very good chance that once Mr.

14

Legg gets through serving the commitment, and the time

15

comes for his release, which it will be at 5 years or some

16

period short of 5 years, there are strong indications that

17

Mr. Legg may come out of that experience worse.

18

he came out of it the same, it still would be a major

19

problem.

20

Legg is that I can't just be all about one hundred percent

21

rehab.

22

magic wane, I would rehab Mr. Legg right now.

23

that.

24

clearly Mr. Legg's performance on this particular case,

25

and I mean the underlying facts in this case and his

And that is that if past

Even if

But the problem, Mr. Demontreux, for me with Mr.

I am not opposed to rehab.

If I could waive the
I can't do

I believe in protecting the public first.

And
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1

performance, while on probation and his prior conviction

2

record, clearly established someone who is just out of

3

control and who continually violates the law.

4

Consequently, those are the reasons, why I am

5

going to follow the recommendation in the Presentence

6

Report and sentence Mr. Legg to zero to 5 years at the

7

Utah State Prison and I am going to order that commitment

8

issue forthwith.

9

demonstrated in his prior conviction record and the

This is a situation where Mr. Legg has

10

underlying facts in this particular case, that he is what

11

I would call anyway a fairly serious threat to the

12

community.

13

Additionally, I think it is appropriate for this

14

court to order full and complete restitution in this

15

particular case for the damage caused to the police

16

vehicle which was rammed in the amount of $7,005.34.

17

note that the officer, who is not seeking restitution,

18

even though apparently he did maintain some minor injuries

19

as a result of this collision and as a result apparently

20

of the chemicals from the air bag that escaped as a result

21

of this collision.

22

I

I don't see any utility, quite frankly, in

23

imposing any additional fines or surcharge assessments but

24

clearly this decision is based upon Mr. Legg's prior

25

record, his inability to complete probation successfully,
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1

and the underlying facts in this particular case, clearly

2

call out to protect the community at this point.

3

else counsel?

4

MR. DE MONTREUX:

Yes, Your Honor.

Anything

My client has

5

served, I believe, 6 months in the jail house.

6

like the court to credit that against his sentence at the

7

Utah State Prison.

8

happen?

9

THE COURT:

He would

Or is that the normal thing that will

What I am about to say,

10

Mr. Demontreux, I am limited by my own knowledge and

11

understanding of the law and as of this day I suggest

12

that the only thing I could do, first of all, would be to

13

make a recommendation because the board is not obligated

14

to credit the time served.

15

That is my understanding.

There are some competing issues regarding credit

16

for time served in this particular case, and I may be

17

mistaken on this but it seems to me that Mr. Legg has some

18

other holds.

19

did know he had a pending matter out of the State of

20

Arizona, I believe, for which he is on probation.

21

is some problem in that regard.

22

the only thing I can do at this point is to make a

23

recommendation.

24

Montreux and Mr. Legg, I don't like making that type of

25

recommendation unless there is a reasonable, rational

I don't know if that is totally accurate.

I

There

The bottom line is that

And the truth of the matter is, Mr. De
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basis for me to make it.

2

think Mr. Legg has demonstrated through the underlying

3

facts of this case and his prior record, that he is of

4

sufficient treat to the community that I could not make a

5

good faith recommendation in his particular case.

6

certainly can't order it anyway.

7

binding.

8
9
10

MR. DE MONTREUX:

And in this particular case, I

I

It would be non-

Thank you, Your Honor.

(Hearing adjourned)
* * * * * * * *

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

0 \) \) 1 <> f

REPORTER'S
STATE OF UTAH

CERTIFICATE

)
)

SS •

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, DOROTHY L. TRIPP, C.S.R., do hereby certify:
That I am one of the Official Court Reporters of
the Third District Court of the State of Utah.
That on Monday, February 26, 1996, I reported
the testimony and proceedings, to the best of my ability
on said date in the above entitled matter, presided over
by the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley in the Third District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah; and that
the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 11,
inclusive, contains a full, true and correct
account of said SENTENCING to the best of my
understanding, skill and ability on said date.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 11th day
of September, 1996.

Dorothy L.^?ripp, C . S . ^ /
Official £6urt Reporter
License No. 22-102239-7801

a*M n

